Through the Looking Glass: Judicial Deference to Academic Decision Makers, the Conflict in Higher Education between Fundamental  Program Requirements and Reasonable Accommodations under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. by Rush, Douglas
1THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS: JUDICIAL
DEFERENCE TO ACADEMIC DECISION MAKERS
The Conflict In Higher Education Between 
Fundamental Program Requirements and Reasonable 
Accommodations Under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act and The Americans With Disabilities Act 
 by Douglas K. Rush*
PROLOGUE1
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said in rather a 
scornful tone. "It means just what I choose it to mean - 
neither more or less." 
"The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make 
words mean so many different things." 
"The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be 
master - that's all." 
Lewis Carroll
English author & mathematician (1832 - 1898)2
* Assistant Dean and Disability Accommodation Coordinator, Saint Louis University School of 
Law. I am especially grateful for the input, suggestions and corrections provided by my wife, 
Janette M. Lohman, J.D., L.L.M. and for the support, review and editorial advice provided by 
Assistant Professor Nicole Porter, Saint Louis University School of Law. 
1 “An introductory speech, often in verse, calling attention to the theme of the play.” The 
American College Dictionary, Random House, 1963 Edition. 
2 Carroll, Lewis, “Through the Looking Glass”, Chapter VI, Project Guttenberg, Champaign, Ill. 
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2INTRODUCTION 
 
Lewis Carroll’s “Through The Looking Glass: And What Alice Found 
There” introduces us to Alice’s dream induced fantasy world in her search for 
passage from Victorian adolescence to adulthood. This novel, together with its 
predecessor, “Alice in Wonderland,” has been analyzed by legions of 
undergraduate and graduate students and their faculty who have divined 
undertones as diverse as awakening sexual liberation and feminism to rebellion 
from Victorian moral absolutism.3
The author’s reading of the novel and review of this commentary suggest 
that Alice’s fall through the looking glass led her to a world where she is a pawn 
and her every move is governed by the strict rules of a chess game. The looking 
glass world is devoid of moral principle. The Red Queen rules through decree 
with little regard for any logical support for her mandates. The rule of law does 
not exist. The Queen’s arbitrary demands are based solely on her authority for 
their justification. In this dream world, reality is a mirror image, nothing can be 
trusted. The characters whom Alice meets are not real, do not show human 
compassion and do not provide guidance through the chess board world. Alice is 
only saved when the kindly White Knight defeats the Red Queen’s Knight and 
leads her through the forest to the chess board’s eighth square where she becomes 
a queen and then awakes from her dream. 
 
3 A web search reveals hundreds of thousands of links to articles, reviews and treatises analyzing 
the subject. Without attempting to list all such sources, the author would suggest that the reader 
google “Through The Looking Glass” if he or she is interested in an exhaustive and exhausting 
study of this issue. 
3Learning disabled students in institutions of higher education, at times, 
must feel as if they have fallen through the looking glass into Alice’s dream 
world. Like Carroll’s Red Queen, many academic decision makers are 
increasingly erecting barriers to such students’ participation in programs of higher 
education based on little more than their arbitrary authority.  Congress’ intent to 
eliminate disability discrimination in higher education is being thwarted by 
administrators who, like Humpty Dumpty, place their own meaning on words 
contained in legislative mandates. The courts are increasingly abdicating their 
responsibility under the doctrine of deference to those decision makers. Where are 
the White Knights to lead these students back to a world in which human 
compassion and moral principles trump arbitrary academic dictates? It is hoped 
that the readers of this article will gain a different perspective of these issues, a 
perspective based on the belief that students with learning disabilities can, and do 
succeed in higher education where they are guided by White Knight 
administrators rather than Red Queens.4
The right of institutions of higher education to make independent 
admissions decisions has been noted to be one of the four fundamental academic 
freedoms under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.5 By 
enacting Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 19736 ( hereafter “Section 504”) 
and the Americans With Disabilities Act7 (hereafter “the ADA”), Congress also 
 
4 My apologies for the “Through the Looking Glass” construct. I admit that it is not original and 
has become, possibly, trite. Nevertheless, to the extent that it stimulates readers to consider these 
issues it may serve a useful purpose. 
5 Regents of the University of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226, 106 S. Ct. 507, 88 L. Ed. 2d 
523 (1985), citing University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978). 
6 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000). 
7 42 U.S.C. § 12101,et seq. (2000). 
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individuals and to ensure that those persons have the right to be judged on their 
ability and not on the basis of their disabilities, real or perceived.8
The right of disabled persons to participate in higher education programs 
can cause inevitable conflicts when academic decision makers weigh fundamental 
program requirements against the need to modify programs to accommodate 
individual disabilities. Issues of academic freedom, including the selection of 
student participants, course content, testing policy and graduation requirements, 
among others, may often clash with Congressional mandates which prohibit 
discrimination against individuals with physical, mental or learning disabilities.  
Recent court decisions demonstrate that courts give great deference to 
academic decision makers, particularly where learning, cognitive or psychological 
disabilities are concerned. Academic and other institutions are placing an 
increasingly greater burden on students to document and prove the existence of 
learning disabilities and their need for academic accommodation.9 Furthermore, 
the recent trend in court decisions is to measure the extent of an individual’s 
learning or cognitive disability against the academic ability of the general 
population. As discussed in the following sections of this article, students with 
 
8 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8), and § 12102(2) (2000). 
9 See, e.g., “Guidelines for Documentation of a Learning Disability in Adolescents and Adults” 
developed by an ad hoc committee of the Association on Higher Education and Learning 
(AHEAD) available on the AHEAD web site at ahead@ahead.org; “Guidelines for Documentation 
of Attention Deficit/Hyperactivity Disorder in  Adolescents and Adults” developed by the 
Consortium on ADHD Documentation and available from the Office of Disability Policy of the 
Educational Testing Service available on the ETS web site www.ets.org; “Guidelines for 
Documentation of Cognitive Disabilities” adopted by the Law School Admissions Council  for 
determining whether to grant accommodations on the Law School Admissions Test which is 
available on its web site at www.lsac.org; and “MCAT Disability Accommodations” adopted by 
the Association of American Medical Colleges for determining whether to grant accommodations 
on the Medical College Admissions Test which is available on its web site at www.aamc.org.
5superior IQ test scores who have documented learning disabilities are being 
denied academic accommodations where their intellectual capacity is equal to or 
exceeds that of the general population.  Those disabled students are often 
prevented from succeeding in graduate level education programs where simple 
accommodations, such as increased time on tests or the use of computers, could 
allow them to successfully complete their programs. The current rationale of 
many courts is that such students may suffer from a learning disability but they 
are not “disabled” within the meaning of Section 504 and the ADA because their 
impairment level still results in an academic ability which matches or exceeds the 
general population as a whole, even thought the general population is incapable of 
completing graduate level academic programs. 
The trend toward evaluating learning disabled  students by comparing 
them to the population as a whole may result in many superior students being 
prevented from fulfilling their educational goals and may deny disabled students 
the opportunity to achieve their career potential. 
This paper will review the statutory mandates of Section 504 and the ADA 
and examine the extent to which courts are willing to defer to institutional 
decisions concerning program modifications to accommodate learning disabled 
students. Courts have long recognized that academic decision makers are entitled 
to deference, especially where their decisions concern educational programmatic 
issues.10 Courts must be vigilant, however, to properly weigh their role as the 
 
10 See: Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 98 S. Ct. 948, 55 
L. Ed. 2d 124 (1978). 
6enforcers of Congressional legislation against the judicial policy of deference to 
academic decisions. 
Section I of this article will review the federal statutory and regulatory 
framework governing disability accommodations as they relate to institutions of 
higher education. Section II will address the potential conflict between essential 
program requirements in higher education and compliance with federal mandates. 
Section III will consider the federal courts’ deference to academic decision 
makers, particularly in regard to granting or denying academic accommodations 
for persons with disabilities. Finally, Section IV will examine two cases which 
demonstrate the limits of the federal courts’ deference to academic decision 
makers. 
 
I. 
 
THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF THE REHABILITATION      
ACT OF 1973 AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AS 
THEY APPLY TO INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION 
.
“There was a book lying near Alice on the table, and while 
she sat watching the White King,… she turned over the 
leaves, to find some part that she could read, ` -- for it's all in 
some language I don't know,' she said to herself.”  
“She puzzled over this for some time, but at last a bright 
thought struck her. `Why, it's a Looking-glass book, of 
course! And if I hold it up to a glass, the words will all go the 
right way again." 
7“`It seems very pretty,' she said when she had finished it, `but 
it's RATHER hard to understand!' (You see she didn't like to 
confess, ever to herself, that she couldn't make it out at all.) 
`Somehow it seems to fill my head with ideas -- only I don't 
exactly know what they are!”11 
A.  Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 
 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 197312 was intended to prevent 
discrimination against handicapped individuals by any program which receives 
federal funds.13 The Act states in part: 
No otherwise qualified individual with a disability14 
in the United States, as defined in section 7(20), 
shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be 
excluded from the participation in, be denied the 
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 
any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance or under any program or activity 
conducted by any Executive agency or by the 
United States Postal Service.15 
The definition of “program” includes “a college, university, or other 
postsecondary institution, or a public system of higher education.”16 Section 504 
 
11 Carroll, supra, Chapter I. 
12 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).  
13 LeStrang v. Conrail, 687 F. 2d 767 (3rd. Cir. 1982). 
14 Section 504 of The Rehabilitation Act as originally drafted used the term “handicapped 
individual.” It was amended to substitute the term “individual with a disability”. Pub. L. No. 102-
569 §102(f) October 1992. The substitution was to make the terminology of the Rehabilitation Act 
consistent with the Terminology of the Americans With Disabilities Act. It was not Congress’ 
intent to change the meaning of the Act. 138 Cong. Rec. 22900, August 11, 1992. 
15 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000). 
16 29 U.S.C. § 794(b)(2)(A) (2000), 34 C.F.R. 104.3(k)(2)(i) (2004). 
8specifically authorizes federal agencies to issue regulations to carry out the 
purpose of the Act.17 
A plaintiff who wishes to establish a violation of Section 504 must prove 
that she meets four elements: (1) that she is an “individual with a disability;” (2) 
that she is “otherwise qualified” for participation in the program; (3) that the 
program receives “federal financial assistance;” and (4) that she was “denied 
benefits of” or “subject to discrimination” by the program.18 
Section 504 defines the term disability as:  “a physical or mental 
impairment that constitutes or results in a substantial impediment to employment 
or a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life 
activities.”19 
An individual with a disability is defined as:  “any person who has a 
physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of such 
person's major life activities; (ii) has a record of such an impairment; or (iii) is 
regarded as having such an impairment.”20 The term “major life activities” is 
defined in the implementing regulations as: “functions such as caring for one’s 
self, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, 
learning, and working.”21 
Section 504 also requires that a person who brings a claim must prove that 
she was subject to discrimination “solely” because of her disability. 22 A disabled 
 
17 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000).  
18 Nathanson v. The Medical College of Pennsylvania, 926 F.2d 1368, 1379 (3rd Cir. 1991) 
; Doherty v. Southern College of Optometry, 862 F2d. 570, 573 (6th Cir. 1988). 
19 29 U.S.C. § 705(9)(B) (2000). 
20 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B)(i-iii) (2000). 
21 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(j)(2)(ii) (2004), 34 C.F.R. 104.3 (j)(2)(ii) (2004). 
22 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000). 
9individual cannot establish a claim under Section 504 if she is unable to meet a 
facially neutral program requirement unless she “can establish that the 
requirement was merely a pretext for unlawful discrimination.”23 
Implementing regulations prohibit educational institutions that receive 
federal financial aid from denying “a qualified handicapped person the 
opportunity to participate in or benefit from the aid, benefit or service.”24 A
“qualified handicapped person” with respect to post secondary or higher 
education is “a handicapped person who meets the academic and technical 
standards requisite to admission or participation in the recipient’s education 
program or activity.”25 
In the admissions and recruitment of potential higher education students, 
an educational institution that receives federal financial aid may not deny 
handicapped persons admission to a program.26 A program may not impose limits 
on the number of handicapped individuals that it may admit.27 The program 
cannot use any test or criterion for admission which has a disparate impact on 
such individuals.28 Furthermore, the program cannot make any preadmission 
inquiry about whether the applicant suffers from a handicap.29 
23Heilweil v. Mount Sinai Hospital, 32 F.3d. 718, 722 (2d. Cir. 1994); Murphy v. Franklin Pierce 
Law Center, 882 F. Supp. 1176, 1180 ( U.S.D.C. N.H. 1994). 
24 34 C.F.R. § 104.4(b)(i) (2004). As noted in FN 14, Section 504 was amended to substitute the 
term “individual with a disability” for the term “handicapped individual.” Regulations issued by 
various agencies may not have been amended and may still utilize the term “handicapped person.” 
The author has used the terminology in the current version of the regulations in the body of this 
paper. 
25 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(l)(1) (2004). 
26 34 C.F.R. § 104.42(a) (2004). 
27 34 C.F.R. § 104.42(b)(1) (2004). 
28 34 C.F.R. § 104.42(b)(2) (2004). 
29 34 C.F.R. § 104.42(b)(4) (2004). 
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Once a handicapped student is admitted into an educational program, the 
student may not be subject to discrimination. 30 The program cannot exclude any 
handicapped student from “any course of study, or other part of its education 
program or activity”31 and must operate its program “in the most integrate setting 
appropriate.”32 
The implementing regulations also require that such a program must: 
make such modifications to its academic 
requirements as are necessary to ensure that such 
requirements do not discriminate or have the effect 
of discriminating, on the basis of handicap, against 
a qualified  handicapped applicant or student. 
Academic requirements that the recipient can 
demonstrate are essential to the instruction being 
pursued by such student or to any directly related 
licensing requirement will not be regarded as 
discriminatory within the meaning of this section. 
Modifications may include changes in the length of 
time permitted for the completion of the degree 
requirements, substitution of specific courses 
required for completion of the degree requirements, 
and adaptation of the manner in which specific 
courses are conducted.33 
Educational programs subject to Section 504 must provide methods of 
evaluating a handicapped student’s performance which measure the student’s 
educational achievement rather than reflect the student’s impairment.34 Programs 
must also provide handicapped students with auxiliary aids which may include 
taped texts, interpreters, readers for students with visual impairments, adapted 
 
30 34 C.F.R. § 104.43(a) (2004). 
31 34 C.F.R. § 104.43(c) (2004). 
32 34 C.F.R. § 104.43(d) (2004). 
33 34 C.F.R  § 104.44(a) (2004). 
34 34 C.F.R. § 104.44(c) (2004). 
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classrooms for students with manual impairments and other similar services and 
aids.35 Such programs, however, are not required “to provide attendants, 
individually prescribed devices, readers for personal use or study, or other devices 
or services of a personal nature.”36 
B. The Americans With Disabilities Act 
 
In 1991, the United States Congress enacted the Americans With 
Disabilities Act,37 after finding that there are over 43,000,000 persons with 
disabilities living in the United States.38 Congress further found that society 
tended to isolate and discriminate against these individuals in critical areas 
including education.39 Congress found that, unlike those suffering from race or 
sex discrimination, individuals suffering from discrimination due to physical or 
mental disabilities often had no legal recourse.40 Congress determined that “the 
Nation's proper goals regarding individuals with disabilities are to assure equality 
of opportunity, full participation, independent living, and economic self-
sufficiency for such individuals.”41 
Accordingly, Congress enacted the ADA: 
 
(1) to provide a clear and comprehensive national 
mandate for the elimination of discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities; 
 
35 34 C.F.R. § 104.44(d)(2) (2004). 
36 34 C.F.R. § 104.44(d)(2) (2004). 
37 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq. (2000). 
38 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (2000). 
39 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2)&(3) (2000). 
40 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(4) (2000). 
41 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2000). 
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 (2) to provide clear, strong, consistent, 
enforceable standards addressing discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities; 
 (3) to ensure that the Federal Government plays a 
central role in enforcing the standards established in 
this Act on behalf of individuals with disabilities; 
and 
 (4) to invoke the sweep of congressional 
authority, including the power to enforce the 
fourteenth amendment and to regulate commerce, in 
order to address the major areas of discrimination 
faced day-to-day by people with disabilities.42 
The ADA is divided into five Titles. Title I concerns disability 
discrimination in employment.43 Title II prohibits discrimination based on 
disability in public programs, services and benefits.44 Title III prohibits 
discrimination based on disability in the area of public accommodations.45 Title 
IV concerns the availability of communications services to hearing and speech 
impaired individuals.46 Title V contains miscellaneous provisions.47 This paper 
will focus on Title II and Title III as they have been applied to accommodation 
requests in institutions of higher education. 
 
The ADA defines ‘”disability” as: 
with respect to an individual-- 
(A) a physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits    one or more of the 
major life activities of such individual; 
(B) a record of such an impairment; or 
(C) being regarded as having such an 
impairment.48 
42 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b) (2000). 
43 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117 (2000). 
44 42 U.C.C. §§ 12131-12165 (2000). 
45 42 U.S.C.  §§ 12181-12189 (2000). 
46 47 U.S.C. §§ 225 and 611 (2000). 
47 42 U.S.C. §§ 12201-12213 (2000). 
48 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2000). 
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Title II of the ADA49 provides that: 
 
Subject to the provisions of this title, no qualified 
individual with a disability shall, by reason of such 
disability, be excluded from participation in or be 
denied the benefits of the services, programs, or 
activities of a public entity, or be subjected to 
discrimination by any such entity.50 
Title II defines “public entity” to include: “A) any State or local government; (B) 
any department, agency, special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or 
States or local government.”51 Title II’s prohibition against discrimination extends to 
public colleges and universities.52 
Pursuant to Title II a: 
"qualified individual with a disability" means an 
individual with a disability who, with or without 
reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or 
practices, the removal of architectural, 
communication, or transportation barriers, or the 
provision of auxiliary aids and services, meets the 
essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of 
services or the participation in programs or 
activities provided by a public entity.53 
Title II of the ADA adopted the remedies and procedures of the 
Rehabilitation Act.54 Title II authorizes the Attorney General to promulgate 
regulations to implement this section, except in areas covered by the Department 
of Transportation, and requires the Attorney General to make his regulations 
 
49 42 U.S.C. § 12131, et seq. (2000). 
50 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2000). 
51 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1) (2000). 
52 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(k)(2)(i) (2004). 
53 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2) (2000). 
54 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2000). 
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consistent with the regulations of the Department of Health, Education and 
Welfare.55 
Title III of the ADA extends the prohibition of discrimination against 
people with disabilities to places of public accommodation.56 A “place of public 
accommodation” includes private undergraduate and post graduate educational 
programs.57 Title III prohibits the use of eligibility criteria that either discriminate 
or tend to screen out individuals with disabilities.58 Title III further requires: 
reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or 
procedures, when such modifications are necessary 
to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, 
advantages, or accommodations to individuals with 
disabilities, unless the entity can demonstrate that 
making such modifications would fundamentally 
alter the nature of such goods, services, facilities, 
privileges, advantages, or accommodations.59 
The Department of Justice has adopted regulations to implement 
Congress’ mandate in the ADA to eliminate discrimination against disabled 
individuals. Testing must be done in a manner which accurately reflects a 
person’s aptitude or achievement level rather than be reflective of her disability.60 
Institutions are not required to permit a disabled individual to participate in a 
program if her participation would “pose a direct threat to the health or safety of 
others.”61 Institutions, however, are required to make an individualized 
assessment to determine whether the nature, duration and severity of the 
 
55 42 U.S.C. § 12134 (a) & (b) (2000). 
56 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (a) (2000). 
57 42 U.S.C. § 12181 (7)(J) (2000). 
58 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (b)(2)(A)(i) (2000). 
59 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000). 
60 28 C.F.R. § 36.309 (2004), Rothberg v. LSAC, 300 F.Supp, 2d. 1093 (D.C.Col. 2004). 
61 28 C.F.R. § 36.208 (2004). 
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condition, when weighed against the potential injury and reasonable modifications 
of  policies which would mitigate the risk, justify exclusion of the individual from 
the program.62 This issue has arisen in cases involving admissions decisions 
involving individuals with communicable diseases.63 
An individual claiming the ADA’s protection must also prove that she 
suffers from a disability which is defined as a “physical or mental impairment that 
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of an individual.”64 
Department of Justice regulations further define disability to include: “any mental 
or psychological disorder such as … specific learning disability.”65 Accordingly, 
it has been held that a person who is claiming the protection of the ADA by 
reason of a learning disability must present proof of a “specific learning 
disability.”66 
A critical issue which occurs in ADA claims in academic settings is the 
issue of what constitutes a “specific learning disability.” A person who has a 
diagnosis of a “learning disability” is not necessarily “disabled” as that term is 
defined by the ADA.67 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Betts v. 
Rector and Board of Regents of the University of Virginia68 considered this issue.  
 
62 28 C.F.R. § 36.207(c) (2004). 
63 For example, see: School Board of Nassau Co. v. Airline, 480 U.S. 273, 107 S. Ct. 1123, 94 L. 
Ed.2d 307 (1987) in which the Supreme Court held that a school district could properly fired a 
teacher who had suffered a relapse of active tuberculosis if no reasonable accommodations would 
prevent her from being a danger to her students. 
64 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000). 
65 28 C.F.R. § 35.104(2) (2004). 
66 Argen v. New York State Board of Law Examiners, 860 F. Supp. 84, 87 (W.D. N.Y. 1994). 
67 Betts v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 23105, at 
p.15. 
68 Betts, supra p. 1. 
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Betts had been admitted to the University’s Medical Academic Advanced Post-
Baccalaureate (“MAPP”) program for economically disadvantaged or minority 
students. Students who completed the program with a minimum 2.75 grade point 
average were guaranteed admission to Medical School.69 Betts had a 2.2 GPA in 
his first semester of the program and he continued into the second semester on 
probation. He was tested for learning disabilities and was determined have 
difficulty with short term memory and reading speed although he was noted to 
have “average intellectual ability.”70 
Betts received extra time to complete his second semester exams and 
received a 3.5 grade point average. However, he had already taken some second 
semester exams without accommodations which reduced his overall grade point 
average to a 2.53 and he was refused admission to Medical School.71 
Betts filed suit alleging a violation of Section 504 and of the ADA. 
Summary judgment was granted to the University as the District Court found that 
Betts was not “disabled.”72 
The Fourth Circuit, on appeal, stated that the analysis of whether a person 
with a learning disability was “disabled” for ADA purposes did not end with the 
diagnosis of the learning disability. Courts must further determine whether the 
learning disability “substantially limits one or more major life activities” as 
 
69 Id. at 3. 
70 Id. at 4. 
71 Id. at 5. 
72 Id. at 7. 
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required by the ADA.73 Learning is considered a “major life activity.”74 Thus 
issue was: how is “substantially limits” defined? 
 The ADA does not provide a definition for this term. The United States 
Supreme Court has held that when Congress does not expressly define a term the 
courts should “normally construe it in accord with its ordinary meaning.”75 The 
Betts Court noted that the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”) issued regulations to carry out the mandate of Title I which defined the 
same term. According to the EEOC, “substantially limits” means: 
(i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the 
general population can perform; or 
(ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner, or duration under 
which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as 
compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the 
general population can perform the same major life activity.76 
The Betts Court held that when “learning” is the “major life activity” a person 
is not disabled “unless his ability is significantly restricted.”77 Accordingly, the 
Court concluded that this determination required a comparison of the “learning 
disability” to the learning ability of most people in the general population.78 The 
Betts Court provided a specific example of such a comparison: 
Student A has average intellectual capability and an 
impairment (dyslexia) that limits his ability to learn 
so that he can only learn as well as ten percent of the 
population. His ability to learn is substantially 
impaired because it is limited in comparison to most 
people. Therefore, Student A has a disability for 
purposes of the ADA. By contrast, Student B has 
 
73 42. U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (2000); Betts, supra p. 16. 
74 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2004). 
75 Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 228, 124 L.Ed. 2d 138, 113 S.Ct. 2050 (1993). 
76 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (2004). 
77 Betts, supra at 17. 
78 Id. at 19. 
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superior intellectual capability, but her impairment 
(dyslexia) limits her ability so that she can learn as 
well as the average person. Her dyslexia qualifies as 
an impairment. However, Student B's impairment 
does not substantially limit the major life function of 
learning, because it does not restrict her ability to 
learn as compared with most people. Therefore, 
Student B is not a person with a disability for 
purposes of the ADA.79 
Therefore, the Court found that while Betts had a learning disability, he 
was not “disabled” within the meaning of the ADA because his learning ability 
exceeded the learning ability of the general population.80 
A similar result was reached in the case of Spychalsky v. Sullivan.81 
Spychalsky had been tested for learning disabilities when he was in high school. 
The testing determined that his overall intelligence was within the high average 
range; his verbal ability was in the lower superior range; and that his non-verbal 
ability was in the lower limits of the high average range. He also tested as high 
average in abstract conceptualization and mathematic ability. The tester also 
found borderline achievement on tests which measure “passive auditory 
attention,” “short term memory” and “mental visual tracking.”82 The tester 
concluded that the findings may indicate either a “lack of effort on the tasks” or a 
“genuine deficit in attention skills.”83 
79 Bettts, supra , citing, Price v. National Board of Medical Examiners, 966 F. Supp. 417 427 
(S.D.W.Va. 1997). 
80 Id. at 20. However, the Fourth Circuit reversed the District Court’s grant of summary judgment 
in favor of the University because it found that Betts was “regarded as having an impairment” due 
to the University granting testing and course accommodations to Betts. 
81 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15704, p.2. 
82 Id.  
83 Id. at 3. 
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 After graduation from high school, Spychalsky attended Boston College 
where he requested no accommodations. He graduated in 1995 and took the Law 
School Admission Test (LSAT) without accommodations.84 
Spychalsky applied for and was granted admission to St. John’s University 
School of Law in 1997. Once admitted, he requested testing accommodations.85 
St. John’s referred him for an additional evaluation which revealed that he tested 
at the 91st percentile in overall intellectual ability which ranked in the superior 
range. However, the tester noted that he had weakness in spelling which tested at 
the borderline level.86 
The tester recommended that Spychalsky not have spelling errors 
adversely affect his grades; that professors be notified not to penalize him for 
spelling errors; and that he should either type his exams with a computer with a 
spell checking feature or that he be allowed to dictate his exams and have a scribe 
transcribe and correct his spelling. The Law School granted these 
accommodations.87 In 1998, Spychalsky requested that the Law School grant him 
“time and a half” to take his exams and again the Law School granted this 
accommodation.88 
In October 2000, the Law School Registrar sent Spychalsky a note 
indicating that he had not completed the course in Taxation which was a 
requirement for graduation. Spychalsky requested a waiver of that requirement 
due to his disability which “significant[ly] affect[ed] [his] ability to manipulate 
 
84 Id.  
85 Id at 6. 
86 Id  at  7. 
87 Id. at  8. 
88 Id. at  9. 
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numbers.”89 Sullivan, a Dean at the Law School, denied his request because the 
Taxation course was considered a core component of the curriculum.90 Her 
decision was reviewed by the Dean of the Law School and by members of the 
faculty who taught Taxation. The decision was also reviewed by the Director of 
the University’s Counseling Center. Based on this review, Spychalsky’s request 
for a waiver of the Taxation requirement was denied.91 Spychalsky then filed suit 
claiming a violation of Title II of the ADA.92 
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment raising the issue that 
Spychalsky was not disabled within the meaning of the ADA.93 The Court noted 
that the United States Supreme Court in Toyota Motor Mfg. Kentucky Inc. v. 
Williams94 held that merely submitting evidence of a diagnosis of a disability was 
insufficient to state a claim under the ADA. Instead, claimants must offer 
“evidence that the extent of the limitation caused by their impairment in terms of 
their own experience is substantial.”95 The District Court then noted that 
Spychalsky had failed to present evidence which indicated that his impairment 
substantially limited the major life activity of learning. Spychalsky had graduated 
from high school, a prestigious university and a top ranked law school.96 The 
 
89 Id.  
90 Id.  
91 Id at 10. 
92 Id. The Court noted that the Title II claim failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted 
because Title II applied to public entities. St. John’s, as a private university, was not subject to suit 
under Title II. Nevertheless, the Court considered the claim as having been brought under Title III 
of the ADA which applied to providers of public accommodations which included private 
universities.  
93 Id. at 12. 
94 534 U.S. 184, 198, 151 L. Ed. 2d 615, 122 S. Ct. 681 (2002). 
95 Toyota Motors Mfg. Ky. Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. at  198. 
96 Spychalsky, supra, p. 24 While the case was pending, Spychalsky took and passed the Taxation 
course and was awarded his law degree. 
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Court further noted that Spychalsky’s testing rated him superior in overall 
intellect and in the superior or high average range on most tests. The District 
Court concluded that “this evidence, evaluated collectively, is insufficient to 
allow a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that Plaintiff was substantially limited 
in his ability to speak.”97 The District Court held that “evidence of certain 
accommodations in high school and college ‘do not suffice to establish a record 
that his impairment created a substantial limitation of’ his ability to learn.”98 
Accordingly, the District Court granted the Defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment.99 
C. Harmonizing the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA 
 
Some courts have held that the elements of a claim under Section 504 of 
the Rehabilitation Act are “identical” to those under the ADA.100 Other courts 
have noted that Title II of the ADA was “expressly modeled” on Section 504.101 
Furthermore, it has been noted that “there is no significant difference in analysis 
of the rights and obligations created by the ADA and the Rehabilitation 
Act”…and that courts are required to “construe the ADA to grant at least as much 
protection as provided by the regulations implementing the Rehabilitation 
Act…[b]ecause the language of the two statutes is substantially the same” and the 
 
97 Id. at 25. 
98 Id. at 28, quoting Jacques v. DiMarzio, Inc. 200 F. Supp. 2d 151, 159 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
99 Id. at 19. The Court also held that Spychalsky’s evidence was insufficient to overcome a motion 
for summary judgment on his ADA claim of having a record of a substantially limiting 
impairment or being discriminated against based on being regarded as having a disability. 
100 Spychalsky, supra at 19, citing Rodriguez v. City of New York, 197 F.3d 611,618 (2d Cir. 
1999). 
101 Zukle v. The Regents of the University of California, 166 F. 3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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“legislative history of the ADA indicates that Congress intended judicial 
interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act be incorporated by reference when 
interpreting the ADA.”102 
This analysis must be viewed with caution in light of the United 
States Supreme Court’s ruling in Toyota Motors where the Court noted that while 
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare was expressly granted 
regulating authority under Section 504, the Equal Opportunity Employment 
Commission was not granted similar authority to promulgate regulations 
interpreting the term “disability” in the ADA. Accordingly the Court stated that 
the persuasive authority of the EEOC regulations is “less clear.”103 
One significant distinction is that under Section 504, a claimant must 
prove that his disability was the “sole” reason for the alleged improper 
discrimination.104 This requirement puts an increased burden on a claimant when 
compared to the requirements of the ADA which only require that the disability 
was a “motivating factor in the discrimination.”105 
Other important distinctions in the two statutes concern the remedies 
available to claimants. Section 504 provides the same remedies that are available 
under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VI”).106 While Title VI is 
silent concerning the availability of a private cause of action for monetary 
damages, it has been well settled that such a remedy is available for intentional 
 
102 Id.  
103 Toyota Motors, supra at 194. 
104 29 U.S.C. §794(A) (2000), See also, Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Science Center, 280 F.3d 98, 
112 (2d Cir. 2001); Amir v. Saint Louis University, 184 F.3d 1017, 1028 (8th Cir. 1999). 
105 Spychalsky, supra at 19. 
106 42 U.S.C. §2000e (2000). 
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violations of Title VI and by analogy also available under the Rehabilitation 
Act107 
Title II of the ADA likewise provides for monetary damages for 
violations. In the case of Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. 
Garrett,108 however, the United States Supreme Court held that the grant of 
sovereign immunity contained in Eleventh Amendment of the United States 
Constitution protects states from claims for monetary damages under Title I of the 
ADA.109 The Supreme Court in Garrett left open the question of Eleventh 
Amendment immunity under Title II and specifically noted that “we are not 
disposed to decide the constitutional issue whether Title II, which has somewhat 
different remedial provisions from Title I, is appropriate legislation under § 5 of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.”110 
In Garcia v. S.U.N.Y. Health Science Center111 the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals, relying on Garrett, struck down claims for monetary damages against 
state actors under Title II of the ADA where claims of discrimination were based 
on “deliberate indifference.”112 The Garcia Court held that Title II claims for 
monetary damages against state actors must be based on “proof of discriminatory 
animus or ill will.”113 
The Garcia Court noted that Title II claims for monetary damages against 
local governmental agencies can still be brought based on a showing of 
 
107 Garcia, supra p. 111. 
108 531 U.S. 356, 121 S. Ct. 955, 148 L. Ed. 2d 866 (2001). 
109 Id. at 374. 
110 Garrett, 121 S. Ct. at 960, n.1. 
111 280 F. 3d 98 (2d. Cir. 2001). 
112 Id. at 114. 
113 Id.  
24
“deliberate indifference” because local governmental agencies do not enjoy 
Eleventh Amendment immunity.114 Furthermore, the Court held that its decision 
did not bar actions against state actors under Title II which sought injunctive 
relief for claims based on “deliberate indifference.”115 
The United States Supreme Court examined the Eleventh Amendment 
immunity issue as it applied to Title II in Tennessee v. Lane.116 In Lane, a sharply 
divided Court held that Congress, in enacting Title II, appropriately exercised it 
power under §5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to waive states’ Eleventh 
Amendment immunity where the constitutional violation implicated the 
accessibility of judicial services.117 
The Supreme Court is still defining the limits of Eleventh Amendment 
immunity as it applies to Title II actions. The Court recently accepted certiorari 
and consolidated the cases of United States v. Georgia118 and Goodman v. 
Georgia119 to determine whether a state was immune from a prisoner’s Title II 
claim of discrimination due to alleged inadequately accessible prison housing. 
Title III of the ADA incorporates the remedies which are contained in 42 
U.S.C. §2000a-3(a).120 Monetary damages are not available to private litigants 
under that section.121 
114 Id. 
115 Id.  
116 541 U.S. 509, 124 S. Ct. 1978, 158 L. Ed. 2d 820 (2004). 
117 Id. at 530. 
118 04-1203, 2005 US LEXIS 3952, decided May 16, 2005, on certiorari from Goodman v. Ray, 
2004 US App. LEXIS 27938 (11th Cir. 2004). 
119 04-1236, 2005 US LEXIS 3953. 
120 42 U.S.C. §12188(a)(1) (2000). 
121 See, Newman v. Piggie Park Enter., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401-402, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263, 88 S. Ct. 
964 (1968); and Spychalsky, supra at  15. 
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II. 
 
THE OTHERWISE QUALIFIED VS. ESSENTIAL FUNCTION 
DILEMMA 
 
“I know what you're thinking about,' said Tweedledum: `but 
it isn't so, nohow.'  
`Contrariwise,' continued Tweedledee, `if it was so, it might 
be; and if it were so, it would be; but as it isn't, it ain't. That's 
logic.'  
`I was thinking,' Alice said very politely, `which is the best 
way out of this wood: it's getting so dark. Would you tell me, 
please?'  
But the little men only looked at each other and grinned.”122 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides that no “otherwise qualified 
individual with a disability…shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be 
excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subject to 
discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial 
assistance…”123 The United States Supreme Court in Southeast Community 
College v. Davis124 noted that this mandate could not be followed literally 
because it would prevent any institution from taking any adverse action against a 
handicapped individual.125 The Court noted that the regulations promulgated by 
 
122 Carroll, supra, Chapter IV. 
123 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2000). 
124 442 U.S. 397, 99 S. Ct. 2361, 60 L.Ed.2d 980 (1979). 
125 Id. at 406. 
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the Department of Health, Education and Welfare stated that a qualified 
handicapped person is “[with] respect to post secondary and vocational 
educational services, a handicapped person who meets the academic and technical 
standards requisite to admission or participation in the [school’s] educational 
program or activity.”126 The term “technical standards” refers to all nonacademic 
admission criteria.127 
The Supreme Court also noted that the implementing regulations 
contained a statement in the appendix which expressed the Department’s intention 
as follows: “under such a literal reading, a blind person possessing all the 
qualifications for driving a bus except for sight could be said to be ‘otherwise 
qualified’ for the job of driving. Clearly, such a result was not intended by 
Congress.”128 The Court concluded, therefore, that “neither the language, purpose, 
nor history of §504 reveals an intent to impose an affirmative-action obligation on 
all recipients of federal funds.”129 In addition, the Court noted that “[s]ection 504 
imposes no requirement upon an educational institution to lower or to effect 
modifications of standards to accommodate a handicapped individual.”130 
Six years later, the Supreme Court revisited this issue in Alexander v. 
Choate.131 The Supreme Court acknowledged that its use of the term “affirmative 
action” had led to much criticism for failing to differentiate between affirmative 
action and reasonable accommodations. It noted that “the former is said to refer to 
 
126 Id.,  45 C.F.R. §84.3(k)(3) ( 1978 ). 
127 Id. at 406. 
128 442 U.S. at 407, citing 45 C.F.R. pt. 84 App. A, p.405 (1978). 
129 442 U.S. at 411. 
130 Id. at 413. 
131 469 U.S. 287, 105 S. Ct. 712, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985). 
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a remedial policy for the victims of past discrimination, while the later relates to 
the elimination of existing obstacles against the handicapped.”132 The Court in 
Alexander concluded that “affirmative action” as used  in Davis referred to 
changes, adjustments or modifications which were “substantial” or which would 
constitute “fundamental [alterations] in the nature of the program”133 when 
compared to “those changes that would be reasonable accommodations.”134 
Accordingly, the Court commented that: 
The regulations implementing § 504 are consistent 
with the view that reasonable adjustments in the 
nature of the benefit offered must at times be made 
to assure meaningful access. See, e.g. … 45 CFR § 
84.44(a) (1984) (requiring certain modifications to 
the regular academic programs of secondary 
education institutions, such as changes in the length 
of time permitted for the completion of degree 
requirements, substitution of specific courses 
required for the completion of degree requirements, 
and adaptation of the manner in which specific 
courses are conducted).135 
The Supreme Court again examined the “otherwise qualified” question in 
School Board of Nassau County v. Airline.136 In Airline, a school district fired a 
teacher who had a relapse of active tuberculosis. The United States Court of 
Appeals held that she was protected by Section 504.137 The Supreme Court 
granted certiorari and held that a person with a contagious disease can be 
 
132 Id. at 300. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 301 note 21. 
136 480 U.S. 273, 107 S. Ct. 1123, 94 L. Ed.2d 307 (1987). 
137 772 F. 2d 759 (11th Cir. 1985). 
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handicapped within the meaning of Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act and 
remanded the case to the District Court.138 
The Supreme Court further held that to determine whether the teacher was 
“otherwise qualified” the District Court:  
will need to conduct an individualized inquiry and 
make appropriate findings of fact. Such an inquiry 
is essential if § 504 is to achieve its goal of 
protecting handicapped individuals from 
deprivations based on prejudice, stereotypes, or 
unfounded fear, while giving appropriate weight to 
such legitimate concerns of grantees as avoiding 
exposing others to significant health and safety 
risks.139 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Zukle v. The 
Regents of the University of California140 determined that Davis and Alexander 
made it “clear that an educational institution is not required to make 
fundamental or substantial modifications to its programs or standards; it need 
only make reasonable ones.” 141 The Davis Court noted that a program receiving 
federal financial assistance may violate Section 504 if it refuses to make 
modifications to its educational program which would not entail undue financial 
or administrative burden.142 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Nathanson v. 
The Medical College of Pennsylvania143 noted that federal regulations required 
 
138 480 U.S. at 289. 
139 Id. at 287. 
140 166 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 1999). 
141 Id. at 1046. 
142 442 U.S. at  412-413. 
143 926 F.2d 1368 (3rd Cir. 1991). 
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consideration of the following factors in order to determine whether an 
accommodation would create an undue hardship: 
(1) The overall size of the recipient’s program with 
respect to the number of employees, number 
and type of facilities, and size of budget; 
(2) The type of the recipient’s operation, including 
the composition and structure of the recipient’s 
workforce; and 
(3) The nature and cost of the accommodation 
needed.144 
The Nathanson Court stated this determination must be made on a case by case 
basis.145 “[W]hat is reasonable in a particular situation may not be reasonable in a 
different situation-even if the differences are relatively slight.”146 
Such case-by-case evaluations have led courts to conclude that: an 
optometry college need not modify or eliminate a program requirement which 
mandates the ability to use certain clinical instruments for a student suffering 
from retinitis pigmentosa, even though those requirements were put in place after 
the student enrolled in the program;147 a law school need not eliminate the 
graduation requirement of completion of the taxation course for a student 
claiming computational and other learning disabilities;148 a medical school need 
not modify its clinical training schedule by giving a student with a reading 
disability eight weeks between clerkships in order to study and prepare for the 
clinic rotations;149 a law school need not allow a disabled student to take a part-
 
144 Id. at 1385, citing 45 C.F.R. § 84.1(c)(1-3) (1990). 
145 Id. . 
146 Wynne v. Tufts University School of Medicine, 976 F2d 791,795 (1st Cir. 1992). 
147 Doherty v. Southern College of Optometry, 862 F.2d 570, 575 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 
U.S. 810, 107 L. Ed. 2d 22, 110 S. Ct. 53 (1989). 
148 Spychalsky, supra at 36. 
149 Zukle, supra at  1050. 
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time course load where the school only offered a full-time program, even though 
the American Bar Association authorizes law schools to have part-time programs 
for the study of law;150 a medical school was not required to allow a dyslexic 
student to provide supplemental oral answers to multiple choice tests;151 a high 
school athletic association was not required to waive its age limitations for 
participation in sports programs for a learning disabled student;152 a university 
was not required to waive its foreign language requirement for students with 
learning disabilities;153 a medical school did not discriminate against a student 
with an obsessive-compulsive disorder who was dismissed after failing his 
psychiatry clinic twice;154 a university need not modify its nursing program’s 
clinical requirements for a student suffering from a non-typical pregnancy;155 a 
college did not discriminate against a learning disabled Physicians Assistant 
student after granting and then withdrawing permission for the student to take his 
examinations orally;156 a law school need not give a student oral examinations or 
allow the student to enroll on a part-time basis;157 a medical school need not 
renew the faculty appointment of a visually impaired physician and did not need 
to offer the physician a part-time appointment;158 a law school need not lower its 
2.0 minimum grade point average standard to accommodate a student with a 
 
150 McGregor v. Louisiana State University Board of Supervisors, 3 F.3d 850 (5th Cir. (1993.). 
151 Stern v. University of Osteopathic Medicine and Health Sciences, 220 F.3d 906 (8th Cir. 2000). 
152 Pottgen v. Missouri State High School Activities Association, 40 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1994). 
153 Guckenberger, v. Boston University,  8 F. Supp. 82 (D.C. Mass. 1998). 
154 Amir v. Saint Louis University, 184 F.3d 1017 (8th Cir. 1999) However, the court reversed the 
district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the University on the student’s retaliation 
claim and remanded the case for further action. 
155 Darian v. University of Massachusetts, 980 F. Supp. 77 (D.C. Mass. 1997). 
156 DuBois v. Alderson-Broaddus College, Inc., 950 F. Supp. 754 (D.C.N.D. Va. 1997). 
157 Murphy v. Franklin Pierce Law Center, 882 F. Supp. 1176 (D.C. N.H. 1994). 
158 Hong v. Temple University, 2000 U.S. Dist LEXIS 7301(E.D.Pa. 2000). 
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central nervous system metabolic disorder;159 a law school need not waive 
minimum grade point average requirements for a recovered alcoholic;160 a law 
school did not discriminate by dismissing and failing to readmit a student 
suffering from post traumatic stress disorder who received more than nine credit 
hours of grades below a C- in violation of the school academic standards;161 and a 
law school did not discriminate against a visually impaired law student by 
dismissing her after she failed to meet its 2.0 academic standard for continuation 
in its program.162 
Conversely, a summary judgment in favor of a medical school was 
reversed on appeal where the school failed to give extra time between clinical 
rotations and then dismissed a student with a verbal processing disorder who had 
repeated failed various clinical programs;163 a university was denied summary 
judgment where it dismissed a pastoral psychology student who was hospitalized 
with clinical depression;164 a state board of bar examiners was ordered to allow a 
dyslexic applicant to take the bar examination using twice the normal time, the 
use of a computer, permission to circle multiple choice examination questions in 
the examination booklet and the use of examinations with enlarged print;165 and a 
testing agency was ordered to give a test taker who suffered from an “expressive 
 
159 Aloia v. New York Law School, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7769 (D.C.S.D. N.Y. 1988). 
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163 Wong, v. Regents of the University of California, 192 F.2d 807 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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writing disorder” fifty percent additional time and a quiet room in which to take 
the Law School Admissions Test.166 
An in depth reading of the above decisions demonstrates that both 
institutions and the courts have struggled while attempting to resolve the 
“otherwise qualified vs. essential functions dilemma”. Some courts have issued 
conflicting decisions within the same year in almost identical cases.167 The 
distinction, if any, in the outcome in these cases appears to be the extent to which 
the individual institutions have documented their efforts to justify what 
constituted “fundamental” program requirements as well as to justify the extent to 
which “reasonable” accommodations could be granted without changing the 
fundamental nature of their academic programs. To the extent that institutions 
could do so, the courts appear willing to defer to academic decision makers.  
 
III. 
ACADEMIC DEFERENCE AND ITS LIMITS 
 
“Everything was happening so oddly that she didn't feel a 
bit surprised at finding the Red Queen and the White Queen 
sitting close to her, one on each side: she would have like 
very much to ask them how they came there, but she feared 
it would not be quite civil. However, there would be no 
 
166 Rothberg v. Law School Admission Council, Inc., 300 F. Supp 2d 1093 (D.C. Col. 204) 
167 See: e.g., Zuckle, supra where the Ninth Circuit on February 23, 1999, upheld summary 
judgment in favor of the University of California on a Rehabilitation and ADA claim filed by a 
medical school student who alleged that the University failed to allow her to retake certain courses 
and clinical programs after repeated failure; and Wong , supra, where a different panel of the 
court, seven months later, reversed a summary judgment in favor of the medical school under 
almost identical circumstances. 
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harm, she thought, in asking if the game was over. `Please, 
would you tell me -- ' she began, looking timidly at the Red 
Queen.  
`Speak when you're spoken to!' The Queen sharply 
interrupted her.”168 
The United States Supreme Court in Board of Curators of the University 
of Missouri v. Horowitz,169 addressed the issue of deference to academic decision 
makers in the case of a student who had been dismissed from medical school for 
failure to meet the school’s academic requirements in her clinical education 
program. Horowitz alleged that she was dismissed without being afforded 
procedural due process in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.170 While the case does not concern a claim under Section 504 
or under the ADA, it is nevertheless instructive of the Supreme Court’s evolving 
deference to academic decision makers. 
 In Horowitz, the Supreme Court noted that the student did not have a 
recognized property right in her medical school education.171 It deferred a 
decision concerning whether she had a liberty interest in continuing her medical 
education.172 Instead, without deciding that such an interest existed, the Court 
concluded that she had been afforded the appropriate due process in her 
dismissal.173 
168 Carroll, supra, Chapter VIII. 
169 435 U.S. 78, 98 S. Ct. 948, 55 L. Ed. 2d 124 (1978). 
170 Id. at 79. 
171 Id. at 82. 
172 Id. at 84. 
173 Id. at 91. 
34
In reaching this decision, the Court addressed the role of the courts in the 
academic decision making process. The Court noted that whether a student is 
making sufficient academic progress or whether the student should be dismissed 
from an academic program is similar to the “decision of an individual professor as 
to the proper grade for a student in his course. The determination whether to 
dismiss a student for academic reasons requires an expert evaluation of 
cumulative information and is not readily adapted to the procedural tools of 
judicial or administrative decision making.”174 
The Court “decline[d] to further enlarge the judicial presence in the 
academic community and thereby risk deterioration of many beneficial aspects of 
the faculty-student relationship”175 and concluded that “[c]ourts are particularly 
ill-equipped to evaluate academic performance.”176 
The Supreme Court in Southeast Community College v. Davis177 
addressed the issue of whether Section 504 required an academic institution to 
modify its educational program to admit a handicapped student. Ms. Davis 
suffered from a severe hearing loss which required her to read lips in order to 
understand what people were saying. The nursing program at Southeast 
Community College refused to admit her due to her inability to understand verbal 
communication. It also refused her request to modify the nursing program to 
eliminate the clinical portion of her training.178 
174 Id. at 90. 
175 Id.  
176 Id. at 91. 
177 Davis, supra at 400. 
178 Id. at 407. 
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Without directly addressing the issue of deference to academic decisions, 
the Court held that the college was not required to make fundamental 
modifications in it nursing program to accommodate Ms. Davis.179 The Court 
noted that “Southeast’s program, structured to train persons who will be able to 
perform all normal roles of a registered nurse, represents a legitimate academic 
policy.”180 The Court stated that Section 504 does not impose an obligation on 
colleges to “lower or to effect substantial modifications of standards to 
accommodate a handicapped person.”181 Finally, the Court noted that: “there was 
no violation of §504 when Southeast concluded that respondent did not qualify 
for admission to its program.”(emphasis added)182 Thus the Court, in effect, 
deferred to the college’s academic decision making concerning admission to its 
nursing program. 
The Supreme Court revisited the academic deference issue in Regents of 
the University of Michigan v. Ewing.183 Ewing had been admitted to the 
University’s Inteflex program which allowed graduation from college and 
medical school in six years.184 Ewing faced immediate difficulty with the program 
and had to repeat several courses.185 Eventually, Ewing managed to complete the 
first four years of the program and took the National Board of Medical Examiners 
Part I Test (NMBE Part I), passage of which was essential to continuing in the 
clinical portion of the program. Ewing failed the NBME Part I, obtaining the 
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lowest grade in the history of the Inteflex program at the University of 
Michigan.186 The University dismissed Ewing from the program and refused to 
readmit him or to let him retake the NBME Part I test.187 
Ewing filed suit alleging various causes of action including a violation of 
his substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.188 The 
District Court conducted a trial and found no violation of Ewing’s due process 
rights.189 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the 
District Court’s judgment, found a constitutional violation and ordered the 
University to allow Ewing to retake the NBME Part I test and to reinstate him if 
he passed the test.190 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the 
decision of the Sixth Circuit.191 
In its decision, the Supreme Court again examined the issue of deference 
to academic decision makers. The Supreme Court stated that: “[w]hen judges are 
asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic decision, such as this one, 
they should show great respect for the faculty's professional judgment. Plainly, 
they may not override it unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted 
academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did 
not actually exercise professional judgment.192 
186 Id.  
187 Id. at 217. 
188 Id.  
189 Id. at 220. 
190 Id. at 221, citing 742 F.2d 913,916 (6th Cir. 1984). 
191 Id. at 228. 
192 Id. at 225. 
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The Supreme Court also noted that it was concerned about treading on the 
academic freedom safeguards contained in the First Amendment.193 It stated that: 
“[d]iscretion to determine, on academic grounds, who may be admitted to study, 
has been described as one of the ‘four essential academic freedoms’ of a 
university.”194 
In Wynne v. Tufts University School of Medicine,195 (hereafter “Wynne 
I”) the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit considered the extent 
to which a medical school must alter its program of instruction to provide 
reasonable accommodations to a learning disabled student. Wynne was allowed to 
enter Tufts Medical School under its affirmative action program for minority 
applicants even though his Medical College Aptitude Test (MCAT) score and 
undergraduate grade point average were lower than most Tufts students.196 During 
his first year in school he failed eight of his fifteen courses.197 He was dismissed 
from the program but was allowed to reenter the following fall.198 
Prior to reentering the school, Wynne underwent neuropsychological 
testing which revealed cognitive difficulties which suggested dyslexia.199 When 
he reentered medical school he was provided accommodations which included 
counseling, tutors, note-takers and taped lectures.200 Nevertheless, Wynne failed 
two courses his second year, Pharmacology and Biochemistry. He was allowed to 
 
193 Id. at 226. 
194 Id., citing University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978). 
195 932 F. 2d 19 (1st, Cir. 1992). 
196 Id. at 21. 
197 Id.  
198 Id.  
199 Id.  
200 Id.  
38
retake these exams and passed Pharmacology but again failed Biochemistry.201 He 
was again dismissed from medical school.202 
Wynne filed suit alleging a violation of Section 504 due to Tufts’ failure 
to allow him to take oral final exams.203 The District Court granted summary 
judgment in favor of Tufts and Wynne appealed.204 A panel of the First Circuit 
reversed stating that on the record below Tufts had failed to show that it was 
incapable of altering its program to accommodate Wynne’s disability.205 
The First Circuit granted rehearing in banc and examined the nature of the 
obligations of educational institutions under Section 504.206 The Court noted that 
Ewing held that when courts review academic decisions they are required to 
“show great respect for the faculty’s professional judgment.”207 Furthermore, 
when courts review the “otherwise qualified-reasonable accommodations” 
requirement of Section 504, they must show the proper deference to academic 
decisions with two qualifications: 
First, as we have noted, there is a real obligation on 
the academic institution to seek suitable means of 
reasonably accommodating a handicapped person 
and to submit a factual record indicating that it 
conscientiously carried out this statutory obligation. 
Second, the Ewing formulation, hinging judicial 
override on "a substantial departure from accepted 
academic norms," is not necessarily a helpful test in 
assessing whether professional judgment has been 
exercised in exploring reasonable alternatives for 
accommodating a handicapped person.208 
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Accordingly, the Court looked to an analysis similar to the process of 
determining the applicability of qualified immunity for governmental decision 
makers.209 The Court created the following test for use in reviewing academic 
decisions: 
If the institution submits undisputed facts 
demonstrating that the relevant officials within the 
institution considered alternative means, their 
feasibility, cost and effect on the academic program, 
and came to a rationally justifiable conclusion that 
the available alternatives would result either in 
lowering academic standards or requiring 
substantial program alteration, the court could rule 
as a matter of law that the institution had met its 
duty of seeking reasonable accommodation.210 
The Court remanded the case to the District Court for a determination of 
whether Tufts met its burden concerning the denial of the requested 
accommodation.211 On remand the District Court again granted Tufts motion for 
summary judgment and Wynne appealed to the First Circuit. (Wynne II)212 
The First Circuit, on appeal, concluded that it would not second guess the 
academic decision made by the Tufts faculty. “The point is not whether a medical 
school is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ in making program-related decisions. Such absolutes 
rarely apply in the context of subjective decision making, particularly in a 
scholastic setting. The point is that Tufts, after undertaking a diligent assessment 
of the available options, felt itself obliged to make ‘a professional, academic 
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judgment that [a] reasonable accommodation [was] simply not available.’"213 
Accordingly, the First Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Tufts.214 
Other courts have added important caveats to the above standards. The 
Third Circuit implied that stringent admission standards may be entitled to more 
deference if they were designed to “protect public health and safety, a concern 
that has been given considerable deference by the courts.”215 Similarly, the Sixth 
Circuit in Doherty v. Southern College of Optometry noted that: “surely the law 
does not require that a handicapped person be accommodated by waiver of a 
requirement when his failure to meet the requirements poses potential danger to 
the public.”216 
The Eighth Circuit refused to decide whether academic institutions, like 
employers, are required under the ADA to engage in an interactive process with 
students to determine whether reasonable accommodations can be found for their 
disability.217 
The Fourth Circuit noted that a university’s academic decisions were 
entitled to less deference and were reviewable by courts where the university 
determined that a student was entitled to extra time on examinations but expelled 
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the student from school based, in part, on grades which were obtained by the 
student before the accommodation was granted.218 
The Ninth Circuit agreed that “a court’s duty is to first find the basic facts, 
giving due deference to the school, and then to evaluate whether those facts add 
up to a professional, academic judgment that reasonable accommodation is not 
available.”219 However, the Court cautioned that: “extending deference to 
academic institutions must not impede our obligation to enforce the ADA and the 
Rehabilitation Act. Thus we must be careful not to allow academic decisions to 
disguise truly discriminatory intent.”220 
Seven months later, the same court in a strikingly similar case, noted that: 
“[w]e must insure that educational institutions are not ‘disguising truly 
discriminatory requirements’ as an academic decision; to this end, ‘the 
educational institution has a real obligation…to seek suitable means of reasonably 
accommodating a handicapped person and to submit a factual record indicating 
that it conscientiously carried out this statutory obligation.’”221 The Court held 
that: 
Subsumed within this standard is the institution's 
duty to make itself aware of the nature of the 
student's disability; to explore alternatives for 
accommodating the student; and to exercise 
professional judgment in deciding whether the 
modifications under consideration would give the 
student the opportunity to complete the program 
without fundamentally or substantially modifying 
the school's standards.222 
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To this end, the Court concluded that institutions need to: “submit 
undisputed facts showing that relevant officials considered alternative means, 
their feasibility, [and] cost and effect on the academic program” and courts should 
not grant deference to academic decisions “when institutions present no evidence 
regarding who took part in the decisions” and stated that “finding simple 
conclusory averments of [the] head of institution[s] [is] insufficient to support [a] 
deferential standard of review.”223 
Finally, the Fifth Circuit determined that while courts must defer to 
academic decisions which are devoid of evidence of malice or ill-will, courts do 
not need to give deference to the American Bar Association standard for 
accrediting law schools when a court considers what accommodations are 
reasonable and required under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.224 
Higher education institutions appear to have learned the lessons of these 
cases. The primary lesson is that the courts will not interfere with academic 
operations as long as institutions can document that a deliberative process was 
undertaken to determine whether a program requirement was truly “fundamental.” 
As long as such a deliberative process was in place, the courts will not second 
guess academic decision makers. In other words, the courts will not try to decide 
whether the institutions decisions were “right or wrong”. 
 Unfortunately, this excessive deferral to academic decision makers can 
sometimes result in the courts not enforcing the mandates of Congress to 
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eliminate discrimination in academic programs where reasonable 
accommodations could allow disabled students to successfully compete in and 
complete academic programs. The courts must be vigilant to ensure that 
explanations offered by academic institutions were not created in hindsight to 
justify their discrimination against disabled students but are truly reflective of 
important fundamental program requirements which cannot be altered to provide 
reasonable accommodation. 
 
IV. 
THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS: ALICE’S JOURNIES THROUGH 
THE WORLD OF ACADEMIC ACCOMMODATIONS AND THE 
STRANGE CREATURES SHE MET. 
“Where do you come from?' said the Red Queen. `And 
where are you going? Look up, speak nicely, and don't 
twiddle your fingers all the time.'  
Alice attended to all these directions, and explained, as well 
as she could, that she had lost her way.  
`I don't know what you mean by YOUR way,' said the 
Queen: `all the ways about here belong to ME -- but why 
did you come out here at all?' she added in a kinder tone. 
`Curtsey while you`re thinking what to say, it saves 
time.'”225 
The Red Queen 
Carlin v. Trustees of Boston University226 
225 Carroll, supra, Chapter II. 
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Marie Carlin entered Boston University’s Doctor of Philosophy program 
in Pastoral Psychology in September 1987. The program consisted of four 
semesters of academic general research followed by a two-year clinical 
component.227 Ms. Carlin complete the first two years of the program and was 
awarded a fellowship from Boston University to attend Danielson Institute for 
Pastoral Counseling to complete the two year clinical portion of the doctoral 
program.228 She completed the first year of the fellowship and, in May 1989, 
received a certificate stating that she had successfully completed the first year 
clinical requirement.229 
Throughout her enrollment in the doctoral program, Ms. Carlin had been 
suffering from depression. Her condition worsened in the spring of 1989 and she 
requested and was granted a leave of absence from Boston University.230 In April 
1990, her condition deteriorated to the point where she was admitted to a 
psychiatric hospital where she remained under treatment until February 1991. She 
requested and was granted an extension of her leave of absence.231 
Ms. Carlin wrote to her academic advisor in June 1991, informing him that 
she was ready to return to the doctoral program. She sent copies of the letter to the 
Dean of Boston University and to the Director of the Danielson Institute.232 She 
received a response in August indicating that the faculty had decided to not 
 
227 Id. at 510. 
228 Id.  
229 Id.  
230 Id. 
231 Id.  
232 Id.  
45
readmit her into the program.233 Ms. Carlin responded by filing suit in the United 
States District Court alleging that the University had violated Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act.234 
Boston University filed a Motion for Summary Judgment stating that the 
decision to terminate Ms. Carlin’s participation in the program was based on the 
academic determination of the faculty which was entitled to deference by the 
Court.235 The Court noted that it was required to defer to the institution’s decision: 
“if there is evidence that the University made a ‘professional academic judgment 
that [a] reasonable accommodation [was] simply not available.’”236 
Ms Carlin responded to the University’s motion by submitting evidence 
that: 
(1) there was no documentation of lack of ability until after she 
took an approved leave of absence; 
(2) her clinical supervisor wrote a letter stating that she 
demonstrated good clinical skills; 
(3) she received a certificate stating that she had successfully 
completed the first year clinical program; 
(4) she was not terminated at the end of the first clinical year but 
was allowed to go on a leave of absence; 
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(5) she was not terminated from the program until she attempted to 
return from an approved leave of absence after her discharge 
from the psychiatric hospital; and 
(6) her academic supervisor wrote a letter stating that the reason 
for her termination from the program was: “her history of 
serious mental health problems.”237 
The Court denied the University’s motion for summary judgment stating 
that Ms. Carlin presented “significant probative evidence of pretext.”238 
The Court noted: 
 
The evidence set forth above suggests that the 
reason articulated by defendants for terminating 
plaintiff was untrue and that the defendants were in 
fact motivated by plaintiff's mental illness and not 
her lack of aptitude in its decision to terminate her 
from the program. Boston University has absolute 
authority to render an academic judgment, but that 
decision must be a genuine one.239 
Humpty Dumpty 
Gluckenerger v. Boston University240 
Boston University is one of the largest private universities in the country. 
Its liberal arts curriculum has long required that students complete four semesters 
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of foreign language as a condition for graduation.241 The University was also 
recognized, prior to 1995, as being among the leading academic institutions in 
proactively addressing the needs of its learning disabled students. The University 
had created the Learning Disabilities Support Services (“LDSS”) staffed by 
trained professionals to evaluate and provide accommodations for students. It was 
often describes as a “model program.”242 
Prior to 1995, LDSS provided accommodations to learning disabled 
students which included, note-takers, tape-recorded text books, extra time on final 
exams and course substitutions, including alternate courses in lieu of the 
University’s foreign language requirement.243 LDSS conferred with the heads of 
various academic departments at the College of Liberal Arts and had developed 
an approved list of courses to substitute for the foreign language curriculum for 
learning disabled students. LDSS had not, however, sought the approval of the 
course substitutions from the President, Provost or central administration at 
Boston University.244 
In the spring of 1995, Boston University’s then Provost and later 
President, Jon Westling, discovered that LDSS had been allowing learning 
disabled students to substitute non-language courses in place of the foreign 
language requirement. Westing had no graduate degrees of any kind and no 
formal academic training in any aspect of learning disabilities.245 
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Westling was, in the words of the Court, “chagrined” to make this 
discovery.246 Westling told his assistant, Craig Klafter to conduct an investigation. 
Klafter confronted LDSS Director, Loring Brickerhoff and demanded proof that 
learning disabilities prevented students from successfully completing foreign 
language courses. Brickerhoff referred Klafter to Brickerhoff’s book on the 
subject.247 Klafter, who had a Ph. D. in Modern History but no experience in the 
area of learning disabilities, reported to Westling that there was “no scientific 
proof that the existence of a learning disability prevents the successful study of 
...[a] foreign language.”248 
Westling informed Norman Johnson, Vice-President and Dean of 
Students, that Boston University was to “cease granting course substitutions 
effective immediately.”249 Westling also ordered that all accommodation letters 
generated by LDSS were to be forwarded to his office for approval before they 
were sent to students or faculty. Westling made this decision without consulting 
any experts or members of the faculty concerning the importance of the foreign 
language requirement in a liberal arts curriculum.250 The Court’s opinion stated 
that the course substitution issue had become “a bee in his academic bonnet.”251 
The Court noted that: “Westling had decided to become personally involved with 
the accommodation evaluation process, even though he had no expertise or 
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experience in diagnosing learning disabilities or in fashioning appropriate 
remedies.”252 
During the time Westling became involved in this process, he “began 
delivering speeches denouncing the zealous advocacy of the learning disability 
movement.”253 He accused learning disability advocates of “fashioning fugitive 
impairments that are not supported in the scientific or medical literature.”254 The 
dominant theme in his speeches was that the movement was: “a great mortuary 
for the ethics of hard work, individual responsibility, and pursuit of 
excellence.”255 In July 1995, he delivered a speech in which he described how a 
shy woman approached him on the first day of class and presented a letter 
containing a diagnosis of learning disability and requesting the accommodation of 
extra time on exams, copies of lecture notes, a separate exam room and that, 
should she fall asleep in class, he should be “particularly concerned to fill her in 
on any material she missed while dozing.”256 He named this student “Somnolent 
Samantha.”257 
During the trial before the District Court, Westling admitted he had 
fabricated Samantha. He further admitted that: “not only that such a student never 
existed, but that his description of her did not even represent a prototype of the 
learning-disabled students he had encountered.”258 
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 The Court noted that by the fall 1995 semester, Boston University was at a 
“bureaucratic impasse.”259 Brickerhoff at LDSS was ignoring Westling’s order 
and was continuing to grant accommodations without Westling’s approval. “Irate 
that his mandates were being disregarded, Westling directly ordered that all 
accommodations letters that LDSS had prepared but that had not yet been picked 
up by the affected students be delivered to his office.”260 Westling and his office 
staff then undertook to review all the approved accommodations even though 
neither Westling nor his staff had any training in the field.261 Westling then 
ordered Brickerhoff to deny the majority of the requests and to immediately 
implement changes in the LDSS procedures demanded by Westling.262 
On December 4, 1995 Brickerhoff sent a letter to all Boston University 
students who were receiving accommodations and informed them that they 
needed to renew their documentation and resubmit their request for 
accommodations if their previous diagnosis was more than three years old. Such 
documentation needed to contain a report by a licensed psychologist, psychiatrist 
or physician.263 
The result, as described by the Court in its opinion was “chaos.”264In early 
1996, Brickerhoff and nearly all of his staff at LDSS resigned.265 Westling hired 
an adjunct law professor to take over the LDSS office. That individual undertook 
to review all the accommodation files even though “the files were in complete 
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disarray and neither he nor any other newly hired DS staff members had any 
expertise in diagnosing learning disabilities or in fashioning appropriate 
remedies.”266 The new LDSS staff was “hand-picked” by Westling and Zafft, the 
new Coordinator of Disability Services, had expressed to Westling her belief that 
“there is too much abuse in the granting of accommodations prior to her 
consideration for the job.”267 All LDSS decisions still had to go to Westling’s 
office for final approval.268 
In the midst of this “chaos,” Elizabeth Gluckenberger and several other 
Boston University students who had diagnosed learning disabilities filed suit in 
the United States District Court alleging violations of Section 504 of the 
Rehabilitation Act, Title III of the ADA and various state law breach of contract 
claims.269 The Court conducted a two week trial and held that Boston University 
had violated the law in regard to certain claims. It ordered money damages 
awarded to the students for Boston University’s change in its disability evaluation 
process and enjoined most of the changes.270 
However, on the foreign language course substitution issue, the Court 
noted that it was required to give deference to the academic decision makers.271 
The Court stated that a university can refuse to alter its programs to accommodate 
disabled students if it “undertakes a diligent assessment of the available options 
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and makes a professional academic judgment that reasonable accommodation is 
simply not available.”272 
The Court further noted that Westling’s “ipse dixit” was not sufficient to 
meet this burden.273 The court stated that: 
Westling’s reliance on discriminatory stereotypes, 
together with his failure to consider carefully the 
effect of course substitutions on BU’s liberal arts 
programs and to consult with academics and experts 
in learning disabilities, constitutes a failure of BU’s 
obligation to make a rational judgment that course 
substitutions would fundamentally alter the course 
of study.274 
The Court ordered Boston University to conduct, within thirty days: “a 
deliberative process for considering whether modification of its degree 
requirement in foreign language would fundamentally alter the nature of the 
liberal arts program.”275 
Complying with the Court’s order, the University decided to use the 
Dean’s Advisory Committee to consider the question of whether the foreign 
language requirement was a fundamental component of the University’s liberal 
arts curriculum.276 The committee was composed of eleven members of the 
faculty of the Liberal Arts College.277 The committee met on seven occasions 
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which were closed to the public. No notes were taken of the committee’s 
deliberation until ordered to do so by the Court.278 
The committee completed its report on December 2, 1997 which 
concluded that “the foreign language requirement is fundamental to the nature of 
the liberal arts degree at Boston University.”279 
In further proceedings, the Court discussed its obligation of deference to 
the academic decision making process. It noted that: “[t]he point is not whether a 
[university] is ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ in making program-related decisions. Such 
absolutes rarely apply in the context of subjective decision making, particularly in 
a scholastic setting.”280 The Court determined that it must give due deference to 
the basic facts which included: “(1) an indication of who took part in the decision 
[and] when it was made; (2) a discussion of the unique qualities of the foreign 
language requirement as it now stands; and (3) a consideration of the possible 
alternatives to the requirements.”281 
The Court noted that the committee had “rallied around” the foreign 
language requirement.282 One committee member believed it was “important to be 
immersed in ancient Greek and Latin to understand Greek and Roman culture.”283 
Another: “waxed that someone who can read in French would realize that 
Madame Bovary dies in the imperfect tense, something that we don’t have in the 
English language, and it makes for a very different understanding of the novel.”284 
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The plaintiffs countered that the University’s policy marked a substantial 
deviation from accepted academic norms. Their evidence showed that the 
majority of liberal arts colleges, including Harvard, Princeton, Yale, Columbia, 
Dartmouth, Cornell and Brown either do not require a foreign language, or waive 
the requirement for learning disabled students.285 Furthermore, the plaintiffs 
asserted that a requirement of four semesters of foreign language is not sufficient 
for most students to read major works of foreign literature, “thus debunking the 
Madame Bovary line of argument as involving an imperfect logic, not an 
imperfect tense.”286 
Finally, the plaintiffs presented the testimony of the Chair of the Language 
and Foreign Studies Department at American University who testified that she 
and other academics: “strongly disagreed with BU’s conclusions and labeled them 
as ‘trite’, ‘idealistic’ or ‘clichés.’”287 
The Court, however, determined that its role was not to “conduct a head-
count” of what was done at other universities, the appropriate question being 
whether the University’s decision is “rationally justified rather than the only 
possible conclusion it could have reached.”288 In conclusion, the Court held that 
the foreign language requirement was: “rationally justified and represents a 
professional judgment with which the Court should not interfere.”289 
CONCLUSION 
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`Now! Now!' cried the Queen. `Faster! Faster!' And they went so fast that 
at last they seemed to skim through the air, hardly touching the ground 
with their feet, till suddenly, just as Alice was getting quite exhausted, 
they stopped, and she found herself sitting on the ground, breathless and 
giddy.  
The Queen propped her up against a tree, and said kindly, `You may rest a 
little now.'  
Alice looked round her in great surprise. `Why, I do believe we've been 
under this tree the whole time! Everything's just as it was!'  
`Of course it is,' said the Queen, `what would you have it?'  
`Well, in OUR country,' said Alice, still panting a little, `you'd generally 
get to somewhere else -- if you ran very fast for a long time, as we've been 
doing.'  
`A slow sort of country!' said the Queen. `Now, HERE, you see, it takes 
all the running YOU can do, to keep in the same place. If you want to get 
somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that!' 290 
Like Alice, many learning disabled students find that no matter how hard they 
attempt to run through the bureaucratic accommodations chess board that they wind up in 
the same place. They are trapped in a country ruled by a Red Queen; a country in which 
they must run twice as fast as is humanly possible if they expect to get anywhere.  
 
Humpty Dumpty also survives today in the realm of academia. Decisions made by 
university faculties concerning participation of learning disabled students in academic 
programs are granted deference by the courts provided the institutions show that they 
engaged in a reasoned decision making process concerning whether requested academic 
accommodations would fundamentally alter the nature of the program. Courts are 
unwilling to consider whether the academic decisions are right or wrong as the courts will 
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not second guess those decisions provided that the institutions can show something more 
that an “ipse dixit” process. 
 Today’s University President Dumpty has slightly amended his statement to: 
“words mean just what I, and the reasoned decision of my hand appointed faculty 
committee, choose them to mean, neither more or less.” In today’s judicial environment 
such a response will ensure the insulation of his academic domain from the intrusive 
mandates of the courts. That is, until the White Knight rescues Alice from the Looking 
Glass World. 
EPILOGUE291 
“Of all the strange things that Alice saw in her journey Through 
The Looking-Glass, this was the one that she always remembered most 
clearly. Years afterwards she could bring the whole scene back again, as if 
it had been only yesterday -- the mild blue eyes and kindly smile of the 
Knight -- the setting sun gleaming through his hair, and shining on his 
armour in a blaze of light that quite dazzled her -- the horse quietly 
moving about, with the reins hanging loose on his neck, cropping the grass 
at her feet -- and the black shadows of the forest behind -- all this she took 
in like a picture, as, with one hand shading her eyes, she leant against a 
green, watching the strange pair, and listening, in a half dream, to the 
melancholy music of the song.”292 
291 “A speech, usually in verse, by one of the actors after the conclusion of the play.” The 
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